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INTRODUCTION: THE CRUX OF CONTEMPORARY CATHOLICISM 
Recent developments in constitutional and international law 
have drawn Catholicism into a formidable controversy. A clash of 
values that are pitting legal and political thinkers against each other 
on momentous issues has not triggered an unequivocal, 
unambiguous response from the Catholic world. Quite the 
contrary—a plurality of voices has surfaced. Such voices do not 
simply differ but often conflict with each other. 
The constitutional changes that are taking place in many 
countries are a stress test for Catholic thinking. So-called “populist” 
regimes or movements—a vast ideological area3 with uncertain 
 
 * The authors conceived the Article and drafted the Introduction and the Conclusion 
jointly. Andrea Pin drafted Part 1, while Luca Vanoni drafted Parts 2 and 3. The authors are 
grateful to Nicholas Aroney, Frederick M. Gedicks, Joel Harrison, and Dmytro Vovk for their 
helpful comments on an earlier draft. Miranda Cherkas Sherrill and McKinney Voss’s editing 
was terrific. All errors remain ours. 
 1. Associate Professor, University of Padua. 
 2. Associate Professor, State University of Milan. 
 3. See David Landau, Populist Constitutions, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 521–22 (2018) 
(including Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, Alberto Fujimori, 
Evo Morales, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan within his list of populist leaders). 
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boundaries,4 often perceived as a constitutional disease5—have 
been challenging the priorities and values of liberal democracies, 
often trying to replace them with alternative values and 
institutional arrangements.6 Catholics are split between liberalism 
and populism. Despite wide national variations, Catholics have 
been siding either in favor of liberal democracies and their 
insistence on the rule of law, human rights, democratic institutions, 
and globalization, or in favor of forces that criticize the traditionally 
governing elites, perceive constitutional and political agendas as 
distant from the concrete needs of the people, and have grown 
skeptical of globalization and of liberalism.7 Although few are the 
Catholic voices that openly support or endorse populist 
movements and regimes, within Catholic culture dwells 
widespread criticism of the constitutional canons that liberalism 
inspires. Some Catholic intellectuals blame liberalism for 
“generat[ing] titanic inequality, enforc[ing] uniformity and 
homogeneity, foster[ing] material and spiritual degradation, and 
undermin[ing] freedom,”8 so they deem liberalism largely 
irreconcilable with Catholicism or with religiosity more broadly.9 
The clash between populism and liberalism—to which Pope 
Francis’s latest encyclical letter Fratelli Tutti (“All Brothers”) devotes 
 
 4. Théo Fournier, From Rhetoric to Action, a Constitutional Analysis of Populism, 20 
GERMAN L.J. 362, 363 (2019) (speaking of populism “not as common ideology, but as a 
common strategy for implementing various distinct ideologies”). 
 5. See Rosalind Dixon, Introduction—Public Law and Populism, 20 GERMAN L.J. 125, 125 
(2019) (talking about democratic “backsliding,” “retrogression,” “rot,” and “decay”). 
 6. Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 546 (2018) 
(“Around the world, liberal constitutionalism is taking a hit from charismatic leaders . . . 
whose signature promise is to not play by the old rules.”). 
 7. Viktor Orban famously advocated the development of constitutional 
“illiberalism” in Hungary. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, The Opportunism of Populists and the 
Defense of Constitutional Liberalism, 20 GERMAN L.J. 314, 321 (2019); see also Bojan Bugaric, The 
Two Faces of Populism: Between Authoritarian and Democratic Populism, 20 GERMAN L.J. 390, 391 
(2019). Burgaric states that “[p]opulism is Janus-faced; simultaneously facing different 
directions. There is not a single form of populism,” but emphasizes that “[w]hat is peculiar 
about the current populist surges” is that they often “challenge the very foundations of 
liberal order as such.” Id. 
 8. PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED 3 (2018). 
 9. Adrian Vermeule, Liturgy of Liberalism, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/01/liturgy-of-liberalism. On the ideological 
conflict between modern statehood and Christianity, see CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, RELIGION 
AND THE MODERN STATE 45–58 (1935). 
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an entire section10 has thus drawn Catholicism into a controversy 
that is creating deep rifts within it. Each faction has aligned itself 
with either the current Pope or his predecessor, as supporters of 
Pope Francis often clash with those who miss the leadership of 
Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI.11 Such a conflict is particularly 
challenging for Catholicism because one of the trademarks of 
Catholicism is its strong unity. The Church’s unity is not simply 
made visible by the Pope. The Catholic Church has rarely shied 
away from speaking its mind on a variety of social issues, ranging 
from family12 and sexuality13 to euthanasia14 and Marxism.15 This 
has not happened by accident: Catholic social teaching is a key 
component of Catholicism, as Catholicism is quintessentially 
concerned with social well-being and flourishing.16 In the Second 
Vatican Council Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes’s words, 
“[a]t all times and in all places the [Catholic] Church should have 
true freedom . . . to proclaim her teaching about society, to carry out 
her task among men without hindrance, and to pass moral 
judgements even in matters relating to politics, whenever the 
fundamental rights of man or the salvation of souls requires it.”17 
This is not a privilege that the Catholic Church claims for itself; in 
fact, “[i]t is her duty to give utterance to, and authoritatively to 
teach, that truth which is Christ Himself, and also to declare and 
 
 10. See POPE FRANCIS, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: FRATELLI TUTTI paras. 155–69 (2020), 
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-
francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html. 
 11. Paul Elie, “The Two Popes” Gives Way to Pope vs. Pope on the Issue of Celibacy in the 
Priesthood, NEW YORKER (Feb. 2, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-
comment/the-two-popes-gives-way-to-pope-vs-pope-on-the-issue-of-celibacy-in-the-
priesthood (“The conflict between progressives and traditionalists has hardened around the 
two Popes.”). 
 12.  CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH paras. 2201–06 (1993), 
https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM. 
 13.  Id. paras. 2360–63. 
 14.  Id. para. 2276. 
 15.  POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: CENTESIMUS ANNUS para. 19 (1991) 
[hereinafter POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS], 
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.html. 
 16. HENRI DE LUBAC, CATTOLICISMO XXIII (1978, Italian edition). 
 17. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ADDRESS OF THE HOLY FATHER TO THE NEW AMBASSADOR OF 
MEXICO TO THE HOLY SEE para. 4 (May 18, 2001), http://www.vatican.va/content/john-
paul-ii/en/speeches/2001/may/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20010519_ambassador-
mexico.html (citing POPE PAUL VI, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN 
WORLD: GAUDIUM ET SPES para. 76 (1965)); see also NORMAN DOE, COMPARATIVE RELIGIOUS 
LAW 372 (2018). 
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confirm by her authority those principles of the moral order which 
have their origins in human nature itself.”18 
This Article does not aim to draw a line between what is inside 
and outside the boundaries of Catholic doctrine, nor does it mean 
to take a stance on who is right or wrong within the Church. It also 
intentionally avoids guessing whether populist leaders give fresh 
political shape to genuine protest movements or rather cynically 
exploit social unrest, dressing it in ideological robes for purely self-
interested goals.19 This Article’s purpose is more modest. It simply 
aims to sketch out why and how such contemporary ideological 
rifts have created distance between groups of Catholics. 
Notwithstanding the fierce, even hostile, confrontations that now 
inhabit Catholic circles, this Article submits that Catholics disagree 
about populism and liberalism because many aspects of both 
resonate with aspects of Catholicism and its mainstream doctrines. 
Instead of triggering hostilities, disagreements among Catholics on 
core societal values could and should therefore be replaced by a 
gentler, more respectful conversation among factions that mutually 
recognize each other as worthy of respect and consideration. They 
could take Pope Francis’s recent offer to engage in a “genuine 
dialogue and openness to others”20—starting with those who share 
their Catholic faith. 
This Article identifies three fields where tensions are pulling 
Catholicism’s social thinking in opposite directions: first, the 
relationship between democracy, freedom, the market, and rights; 
second, the role of identity and tradition; and third, the separation 
of powers and the importance of constitutional interpretation. It 
analyzes each topic in light of contemporary legal discourse, 
discusses how and why Catholics are leaning toward either side, 
and suggests that many conflicts within Catholicism may become 
lively conversations that draw upon essential features of Catholic 
culture. As it focuses on the contemporary confrontations between 
supporters of liberalism and populism, it does not explicitly deal 
with longstanding debates around the theoretical compatibility 
between liberalism and Catholicism and their complex historical 
 
 18. POPE PAUL VI, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: DIGNITATIS HUMANAE para. 
14 (1965), http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/ 
vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html. 
 19. Gabor Halmai, Populism, Authoritarianism and Constitutionalism, 20 GERMAN L.J. 
296, 300 (2019). 
 20. POPE FRANCIS, supra note 10, para. 203. 
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relationships.21 An inherited degree of mutual skepticism between 
Catholic and liberal thinkers may have pushed Catholics closer to 
populism—but this Article argues that it is mostly contemporary 
legal, political, and cultural issues that have widened the gaps 
between Catholics and liberalism. The authors will consider it a 
success if they are able to reinvigorate the consciousness that, as the 
great Protestant thinker Richard Niebuhr once noted, “the types of 
Christian morality are not measures of value.”22 
I. DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM: MEANS AND ENDS 
Contemporary Catholicism has often valued the benefits of 
modern constitutionalism. Appreciation of the rule of law, 
democracy, and human rights abounds within papal documents.23 
Since the late nineteenth century’s Syllabus of Errors and its 
condemnation of liberalism, a sea-change has taken place within 
Catholic doctrine.24 After opposing gross human rights violations 
by the Nazis in the first half of the twentieth century, the Catholic 
Church became a vocal supporter of liberty, equality, and human 
dignity.25 Since the 1940s, it has endorsed the human rights 
revolution and the democratization of the world both at national 
and international levels.26 For most of the nineteenth century, 
Catholics in the United States, who had already been exposed to the 
ideals of liberal constitutionalism, struggled initially to find their 
place alongside Protestants but later came to enjoy the blessings of 
the American constitutional experiment by urging their co-
religionaries to reconsider liberalism.27 
Catholicism promoted the values of democracy and liberty 
throughout the Iron Curtain era. It was John Paul II’s explicit 
criticism of the regime in Poland that boosted the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe.28 The Berlin Wall’s Fall Zeitgeist, 
 
 21. See, e.g., SAMUEL MOYN, CHRISTIAN HUMAN RIGHTS 3–4 (2015). 
 22. H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST & CULTURE, at iv (2001). 
 23.  See generally POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 15, para. 44. 
 24. J. Bryan Hehir, The Modern Catholic Church and Human Rights: The Impact of the 
Second Vatican Council, in CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 113–14 
(John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2010). 
 25. On the relationship between Christian and liberal conceptions of human dignity, 
see Nicholas Aroney, The Rise and Fall of Human Dignity, 46 BYU L. REV. 1211 (2021). 
 26. MOYN, supra note 21. 
 27. JOHN C. MURRAY, THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 51–52 (1965). 
 28. MASSIMO BORGHESI, CRITICA DELLA TEOLOGIA POLITICA 256 (2013). 
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however, probably overlooked important nuances. Captured by 
the fall of communism, the prevailing political and legal thinking 
of the time misunderstood the historical victory of Western 
freedoms and papal support for a perpetual marriage between 
Catholicism and liberalism.29 
Within a few years after the Wall fell, this misunderstanding 
became apparent. Catholic thinkers and movements started 
warning that democracy and human rights had more than just a 
bright side. A much broader skepticism about the reputation of 
liberalism and liberal democracies has more recently surfaced 
within Catholic circles.30 The connections that tied together the 
Catholic Church and the supporters of post-modern liberal 
constitutionalism seem to have softened, if not dissipated. Catholic 
thinkers have started questioning liberal values and institutions, 
targeting liberal economies and liberalism altogether. 
A. The Perils of Liberal Economies 
Understandably, the staunch and even vocal Catholic resistance 
to communist regimes joined forces with supporters of capitalism 
during the Cold War. While Catholicism targeted the communist 
thinking that cracked down on religious freedom31 and “reduced 
man to matter,”32 economic liberalism targeted the state monopoly 
 
 29. For a synthesis of the role of the Church in the transition between the communist 
regime and liberal democracy in Poland, see Jacqueline Hayden, Solidarity at 40: How the 
Union that Brought Down Communism Became a Conservative Government Ally, NOTES FROM 
POLAND (Aug. 28, 2020), https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/08/28/solidarity-at-40-how-
the-union-that-brought-down-communism-became-a-conservative-government-ally/. 
 30. See Frederick M. Gedicks, Dignity and the Overlapping Consensus, 46 BYU L. REV. 
1245, 1265–66 (2021). 
The refusal of conservative Christians to accept some applications of equal rights 
and equal dignity is not simply the consequence of group self-interest. 
Conservative Christian religions—especially Catholicism—adhere to one 
conception of the good; they claim that the truth about God and his creation is 
accessible to all through the exercise of natural reason. Laws, institutions, and 
other government actions that do not conform to the natural law are unjust and 
deficient . . . . 
Id. 
 31.  POPE PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: DIVINI REDEMPTORIS para. 10 (1937), 
http://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
xi_enc_19370319_divini-redemptoris.html. 
 32. MOYN, supra note 21, at 38. 
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over national economies.33 An alliance between liberalism and 
Catholicism seemed to provide the “moral-cultural base” or “moral 
ecology . . . that undergirds, sustains, and guides economic and 
democratic freedom[s].”34 
After the collapse of communism in Europe, the two intellectual 
strands went hand in hand, driving the expansion of market 
freedoms in Eastern Europe and, later, the strengthening and 
enlargement of European legal integration. In the 1990s, many 
countries of the Eastern Bloc, including some post-Soviet republics, 
applied to join the European Communities, which transitioned into 
the European Union soon thereafter.35 
The economic theories of the European Communities and of the 
European Union between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s supported 
this process of integration. The free market was, in fact, an 
overarching theme of the pan-European political and legal 
integration process, which the Catholic Church welcomed.36 
Economic freedoms had already played a crucial role in replacing 
national rivalries, industrial dumping, and retaliatory customs 
policies with open borders for people, goods, and companies in the 
1950s and 1960s in Western Europe, and these freedoms could 
reasonably be expected to do the same within Eastern Europe. This 
was not the same economic philosophy espoused by the United 
States, but it was certainly much closer than the alternative of 
highly nationalized or state-controlled economies. 
The alliance between Catholicism and European integration, 
including its economic policies, lasted until the global financial 
crisis in 2008. Ties between the European Union, Catholicism, and 
liberalism faded away, as evidenced by the shift in winners of the 
Charlemagne Prize. Since 1950, this award has honored the 
protagonists of European unification under the auspices of pan-
 
 33. Nowadays, this approach is still particularly evident within various intellectual 
circles. See, e.g., Peter Berkowitx, Capitalism, Socialism, and Freedom, HOOVER INST. (Feb. 2020), 
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/prosperityproject_ 
peterberkowitz_updated.pdf. 
 34.  R.R. Reno, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, FIRST THINGS (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/10/the-spirit-of-democratic-capitalism (citing 
Michael Novak, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (1982)). 
 35. PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW 14–28, 582 (5th ed. 2011). 
 36. As to the historical link between Catholicism, the leading Christian Democratic 
parties that governed much of post-World War II Western Europe, and European legal 
integration, see BRENT F. NELSEN & JAMES L. GUTH, RELIGION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
EUROPEAN UNION 182 (2015). 
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European institutions,37 including Adenauer, De Gasperi, 
Schuman, and George Marshall. In 2002, the prize went to the 
newborn euro currency, which had reinforced the budgetary 
constraints on E.U. member states; in 2004, an extraordinary edition 
of the award was given to Pope John Paul II; Angela Merkel was 
awarded the prize in 2008. In 2012, the winner was the German 
Minister of Finance, Wolfgang Schaeuble, who had supported 
austerity measures within E.U. countries to counter the economic 
crisis that exploded in 2008. The year Schaeuble won the prize, 
however, the crisis hit hard on many European countries and 
caused the tides to turn. 
During the crisis, many European countries could not fight the 
collapse of their economies because of the Eurozone’s strong fiscal 
constraints, which forced them to embark on austerity measures 
while securing free markets. Vast portions of European society 
discovered that, by supporting measures to protect the common 
market and secure the value of the currency that they had warmly 
welcomed a little more than a decade before, they had tied their 
hands: many states could not fight the economic depression 
effectively because of their commitment to protecting the euro and 
to avoiding unsettling markets.38 Pope Francis himself, who won 
the 2016 edition of the Charlemagne Prize, voiced his strong 
concerns for the flaws of globalized economy and for the price that 
people in Europe and elsewhere paid for them.39 
The crisis destroyed the belief that globalization and economic 
freedom would secure prosperity, or even a decent life. At first, the 
economic collapse showed that globalization, the free market, and 
deregulation had not insulated modern states from deep financial 
and social crises.40 Or, in the words of Pope Francis in his encyclical 
letter Fratelli Tutti, “[t]he marketplace, by itself, cannot resolve 
 
 37. Origin, DER INTERNATIONALE KARLSPREIS ZU AACHEN, 
https://www.karlspreis.de/en/charlemagne-prize/origin (last visited Feb. 9, 2021). 
 38. See generally KLAUS BUSCH, CHRISTOPH HERMANN, KARL HINRICHS & THORSTEN 
SCHULTEN, FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG, EURO CRISIS, AUSTERITY POLICY AND THE EUROPEAN 
SOCIAL MODEL: HOW CRISIS POLICIES IN SOUTHERN EUROPE THREATEN THE EU’S SOCIAL 
DIMENSION (2013), https://www.europe-solidarity.eu/documents/ES_crisis.pdf. 
 39. For a deeper discussion of Pope Francis’s economic and social views, see ANDREA 
TORNIELLI & GIACOMO GALEAZZI, THIS ECONOMY KILLS: POPE FRANCIS ON CAPITALISM AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE (2015). 
 40. Andrea Pin, The Transnational Drivers of Populist Backlash: The Role of Courts, 20 
GERMAN L.J. 225, 238–39 (2019). 
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every problem.”41 Later, the austerity policies that the European 
Union and its members favored or implemented showed that such 
ideals could even constitute an obstacle to the states’ capacity to 
provide adequate social protection and strengthen economic safety 
nets in times of distress.42 European society split into those who, on 
one side, acknowledged the harm inflicted by austerity, but 
justified it as a necessary treatment to resurrect the economy  
and restore social welfare, and those on the other side who  
believed that such measures were simply a bad solution, which 
deprioritized social care, economic stability, and welfare in the 
name of economic liberalism.43 
Especially in Europe, Catholics were involved in such clashes. 
Within the Catholic camp, authoritative speakers such as Caritas 
Europa, the continental network of Catholic relief and development 
agencies, voiced their concern that austerity was overlooking the 
basic needs of the poor.44 Overall, the European Union’s response 
to the global economic crisis abrogated the decades-long Catholic 
support of European integration, thereby paving the way for anti-
supranational, nation-focused political platforms that embraced 
populist movements among Catholics.45 
B. The Quagmire of Rights 
While liberalism and Catholicism joined forces under the Iron 
Curtain to fight communism, they never merged with each other. 
Among Catholic thinkers has always dwelled the perception that 
liberalism and the doctrine of the Catholic Church may overlap 
substantially but do not coincide. For decades, this was mostly a 
matter for philosophers and theologians,46 but now it has become a 
hotly debated political and legal topic. Two factors have brought to 
light the deep rifts between Catholic and liberal thinkers, namely 
 
 41. POPE FRANCIS, supra note 10, para. 168. 
 42. Jan C. Suntrup, From Emergency Politics to Authoritarian Constitutionalism? The Legal 
and Political Costs of EU Financial Crisis Management, 19 GERMAN L.J. 375, 400 (2018). 
 43. Andrea Pin, Comparative Constitutional Law, Human Rights, and Belonging 
 in Europe, RESET DIALOGUES ON CIVILIZATIONS (June 5, 2020), https://www.resetdoc.org/ 
story/comparative-constitutional-law-rights-and-belonging-in-europe/. 
 44. Caritas: European Austerity Measures Threaten Social Services, CATH. CULTURE (Dec. 
21, 2011), https://www.catholicculture.org/news/headlines/index.cfm?storyid=12747. 
 45. Daphne Halikiopoulou, Economic Crisis, Poor Governance and the Rise of Populism: 
The Case of Greece, 55 INTERECONOMICS 34 (2020). 
 46. Brian Tierney, Villey, Ockham and the Origin of Individual Rights, in THE WEIGHTIER 
MATTERS OF THE LAW 1 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank Alexander eds., 1988). 
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the rise of a human rights-based lingua franca and the post-9/11 
multilateral intervention in the Middle East. 
1. Human rights as a lingua franca 
The alliance between Catholicism and the human rights 
revolution in the second half of the twentieth century was strongly 
substantiated by universalism. In Catholic thought, universalism is 
based on the idea that all human beings share a common 
ontological nature because they were all created by God.47 This 
belief has resonated with theories of human rights that have 
chartered a new course in the field of international law.48 Despite 
this historical common ground, liberalism and Catholicism have 
recently started to significantly diverge from one another on 
practical matters. In fact, although both place the human being at 
the center of their legal and political theories, they have 
increasingly disagreed on the substance of this idea. Two issues, in 
particular, make up this disagreement. 
First, Catholic thinking found that the process of secularization 
promoted by liberalism worldwide was pushing the spiritual and 
religious component of individual and social life to the margins.49 
The rights-centered edifice of liberal constitutionalism has thus 
become a rival, rather than a partner of religion, as it has gradually 
replaced transcendental values with nonreligious values.50 
Catholics, alongside other religious groups, have thus come to 
perceive that their faith was being walled out of the public sphere 
and that they were becoming socially and politically irrelevant. 
Although in different guises, the French theorization of a secular 
 
 47. As the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (432) states, “The Christian 
message offers a universal vision of the life of men and peoples on earth that makes us realize 
the unity of the human family.” PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM 
OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH (2004) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM], 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_ 
justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2021). 
 48. Paolo G. Carozza & Daniel Philpott, The Catholic Church, Human Rights, and 
Democracy: Convergence and Conflict with the Modern State, 15 LOGOS: J. CATH. THOUGHT & 
CULTURE 15 (2012). 
 49. John Paul II warned the international community of states not to prioritize the 
“[m]aterial goods” over the “spiritual goods.” See Hehir, supra note 24, at 127. 
 50. JAVIER PRADES, NOSTALGIA DI RESURREZIONE 13 (2007) (“[A]ssistiamo a un 
fenomeno linguistico, sociale e, ormai, anche giuridico, secondo cui la vita, in tutte le sue 
dimensioni, smette di essere considerata dono per essere invece rivendicata come diritto . . . 
vorrei richiamare l’attenzione sulla tendenza a trasformare ogni possibilità umana in diritto 
e a eliminarne, in maniera direttamente proporzionale, il carattere di dono.”). 
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public sphere and the U.S.-led frenzy for a “naked public square”51 
were perceived as depriving social and political life of the richness 
of the Catholic tradition. 
Second, Catholicism could not follow what many have 
perceived to be a utilitarian turn within liberalism. To some, 
secularism has made liberalism not just flat but even self-centered. 
In their view, contemporary liberalism’s utmost concern is for “the 
satisfaction of current wants or preferences without worrying 
much about the formation of those wants and preferences.”52 Such 
hedonistic degeneration of liberalism, they argue, has loosened 
social bonds, disconnected freedom from pursuing good, and 
legitimized any way of life regardless of its goals. 
The late twentieth century’s human rights scenario has thus 
triggered widespread skepticism within Catholicism. As Mary Ann 
Glendon emphasized almost thirty years ago, “rights talk” has 
taken center stage, making individualism the core legal value, and 
individualist legal claims the main driver of legal change.53 The 
idea of fundamental or human rights has celebrated the role of the 
individual and her isolation from the rest of society. Catholic circles 
complain that, instead of building bridges between individuals, 
enabling minorities to fully participate in the public sphere, and 
insulating them from government overreach, a rights-centered 
legal discourse has broken the ties between the individual and the 
polity.54 It has impoverished political discourse, transforming it 
into the terrain of reciprocal individual claims.55 In essence, 
Catholic circles argue that the rights-centered legal discourse has 
monopolized politics and hollowed out democratic debate. It has 
substantially limited room for governmental policies. It has 
exacerbated social rifts rather than reconciling them. 
 
 51. RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA (1986). 
 52. LARRY SIEDENTOP, INVENTING THE INDIVIDUAL: THE ORIGINS OF WESTERN 
LIBERALISM 363 (2014) (arguing that the failure to understand the relationship between liberal 
secularism and Christianity contributes to two temptations or liberal heresies: utilitarianism 
and individualism). 
 53. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991). 
 54. DENEEN, supra note 8, at 30–31. 
 55. Pope Francis, in Fratelli Tutti, complains about the contemporary “complete 
division between individuals and human community.” See POPE FRANCIS, supra note 10, 
para. 31. 
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Catholic culture usually sees such logic at play within most of 
the rights it considers controversial; euthanasia, birth control, and 
same-sex partnerships and marriage have found their roots in the 
ideals of self-realization, privacy, and freedom.56 Since liberalism 
seems to have bred these rights and the constitutional engines 
within which they thrive, many Catholics have come to blame 
liberalism and its ideals of privacy and freedom. When Catholics 
endorsed liberalism, they did not embrace self-centered 
individualism. On the contrary, they maintained that full 
realization of human potential was conceivable only with reference 
to an objective good, and that the whole polity had a role to play in 
identifying it.57 In other words, many have complained that 
liberalism’s understanding of liberty betrays its own nature, as well 
as the promises of democracy.58 
Some Catholic factions have thus grown so skeptical of the 
ideals of liberty, privacy, and self-realization, that they have leaned 
toward populist movements as a political antidote to liberalism. 
They have come to consider the contemporary ideals of freedom 
and individualism so antithetical to Catholic culture, its social 
dimension, and the role of democratically elected bodies, that they 
have gone the other way. Viktor Orban, the Hungarian Prime 
Minister, has deemed Hungary an exemplary “illiberal” 
democracy.59 This moniker might be perceived as an oxymoron, but 
it resonates with the feelings of those who oppose too sweeping an 
understanding of freedom—one that dissolves social and political 
bonds into a mass of self-isolated individuals. 
2. The freedoms of the Middle East 
The marriage between Western liberalism and Catholicism also 
eroded during the events that shook the Middle East in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The coalition that toppled the regime 
 
 56. JOHN PAUL II, MEMORIA E IDENTITÀ 22–23 (2005). 
 57. As noticed by Joel Harrison, Christian Accounts of Religious Liberty: Two Views of 
Conscience, 46 BYU L. REV. 1273, 1297 (2021), “[o]n the inter-subjective view of conscience, 
still present in Christian religious liberty discourse, the person has a duty to pursue God as 
one’s own end. This entailed forming a community—conscience was not simply an act of the 
individual, but it was directed to social ends. Conscience, in other words, is exercised in aid 
of a flourishing community.” 
 58. DENEEN, supra note 8, at 65–66. 
 59. Csaba Tóth, Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July 
2014, BUDAPEST BEACON (July 29, 2014), https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-
orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/. 
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of Saddam Hussein in Iraq was a matter of deep controversy, even 
within Catholicism. The U.S. and U.K.-led coalition was hoping to 
replace the rogue state with a stable and just democratic regime, 
one in which all citizens would enjoy the same rights, be subject to 
the same duties, and participate in free, competitive elections.60 
Alongside the Bush and Blair administrations were towering 
Catholics figures, who forecasted that a just war would succeed in 
exporting these conditions for a dignified, free Iraq. Among these 
thinkers were people such as John Neuhaus, the founder of the 
influential First Things magazine;61 John Paul II’s biographer and 
theologian, George Weigel;62 and Michael Novak,63 a Catholic 
philosopher who had successfully merged Catholic ideals with the 
fundamentals of American liberalism. They each strongly 
advocated the military intervention as a necessary means to achieve 
indispensable goals, borrowing from Catholic doctrine to support 
their position.64 
The hierarchy of the Catholic Church, however, largely 
opposed the war.65 The justification for a military intervention was 
fragile from an international law perspective. While military 
intervention in Afghanistan took place under the umbrella of the 
United Nations,66 the Iraqi campaign lacked a similar basis.67 
 
 60. George W. Bush, President Outlines Steps to Help Iraq Achieve Democracy and 
Freedom, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 24, 2004), https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040524-10.html. 
 61. BORGHESI, supra note 28, at 267. 
 62. George Weigel, Moral Clarity in a Time of War, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 2003), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2003/01/001-moral-clarity-in-a-time-of-war. 
 63. Michael Novak, Was the War in Iraq Just?, 9 NEXUS 11–15 (2004). 
 64. Richard J. Neuhaus, The Sounds of Religion in a Time of War, FIRST THINGS (May 
2003), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2003/05/the-sounds-of-religion-in-a-time-of-
war; see Peter Dula, The War in Iraq: How Catholic Conservatives Got It Wrong, COMMONWEAL 
MAG. (Nov. 30, 2004), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/war-iraq. 
 65. Gerard O’Connel, Quando Bush Gnorò la Lettera di Wojtila Contro la  
Guerra Irachena, VATICAN INSIDER (July 10, 2019), https://www.lastampa.it/vatican-
insider/it/2011/09/27/news/quando-bush-ignoro-la-lettera-di-wojtyla-contro-la-guerra-
irachena-1.36932734. 
 66. U.N. SCOR, 4443rd mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001), 
https://undocs.org/S/RES/1386(2001). 
 67. Ewen MacAskill & Julian Borger, Iraq War Was Illegal and Breached UN  
Charter, Says Annan, GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2004), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq. 
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However, John Paul II,68 as well as other Catholic institutions and 
U.S. Catholic bishops,69 did warn against the Iraqi intervention on 
other grounds. The conditions of a just war, they argued, were not 
met and the campaign was more likely to bring anarchy and chaos 
rather than democracy and freedom.70 Many Catholic circles 
believed that the ideals of liberalism and democracy would not 
have the success that supporters of the intervention expected, and 
that the fall of Saddam Hussein would expose Christian minorities 
to more violence than they had experienced under his regime.71 
Regardless of the final outcome of the Iraqi invasion, the intra-
Catholic debate on that occasion showed that within Catholicism 
dwelled various beliefs about the exportability of liberty, the 
hierarchy of legal values, and the very idea of a military mission 
with a strong moral character aimed at uplifting the legal and civic 
standards of another country.72 Catholic circles disagreed on how 
to prioritize peace, social stability, democracy, and the enjoyment 
of freedoms. Overall, the Church indicated ambivalence toward 
liberalism. As a philosophy that urged political leaders and public 
opinion to protect and promote basic freedoms, it was certainly 
welcomed. It was not the paramount ideal, however, that stood 
above any other consideration, nor was it the yardstick against 
which international relations had to be measured.73 In the eyes of 
staunch promoters of liberalism, the Catholic Church became a 
lukewarm supporter of this idea, quick to abandon it when it was 
prone to generate controversy. 
 
 68. Frank Bruni, Threats and Responses: The Vatican; Pope Voices Opposition, His 
Strongest, to Iraq War, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2003/01/14/world/threats-responses-vatican-pope-voices-opposition-his-strongest-iraq-
war.html. 
 69. Paul Moses, Vatican Diplomacy & the Iraq War, COMMONWEAL MAG. (Jan. 13, 2020), 
https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/vatican-diplomacy-iraq-war. 
 70. BORGHESI, supra note 28, at 267. 
 71.  John Dear, The Catholic Campaign to End Iraqi War, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Aug. 21, 
2007), https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/road-peace/catholic-campaign-end-iraq-war. 
 72. See WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, THE TRAGEDY OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 270–75 (2016). 
 73. Catholic disapproval of George W. Bush’s decision to topple Saddam Hussein in 
the name of the imperative to “free the world from evil” was later reiterated in Antonio 
Spadaro & Marcelo Figueroa, Evangelical Fundamentalism and Catholic Integralism: A 
Surprising Ecumenism, LA CIVILTÀ CATTOLICA (July 13, 2017), 
https://www.laciviltacattolica.it/articolo/evangelical-fundamentalism-and-catholic-
integralism-in-the-usa-a-surprising-ecumenism/. 
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II. POLITIES, TRADITIONS, AND IDENTITIES 
The spatial dimension of legal regimes has also generated 
controversy between Catholicism and liberalism. While Catholic 
thinking has constantly maintained that all human beings, 
regardless of time and place, are endowed with certain unalienable 
rights, it has also valued the distinct traditions that all peoples have 
developed throughout their history. Or, in the great theologian 
Henri De Lubac’s words, “civilizations, as original as people are, 
are irreducibly different.”74 
The universal vocation of the Church and its global reach 
resonates strongly with globalization. As its jurisdiction covers the 
whole earth, its concern for human beings and for their dignity is 
also universal. The local dimension of the Church, however, values 
the distinct features of any national, subnational, or cultural 
variation. The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church 
celebrates the centrality of “a true international community”75 and 
the importance of “international law” as “the guarantor of the 
international order,” while warning about the risk of “relativizing 
or destroying the different and distinctive characteristics of each 
people.”76 More recently, Pope Francis’s encyclical letter Fratelli 
Tutti defends each country’s “distinct way” to grow and “to 
develop its capacity for innovation while respecting the values of 
its proper culture.”77 The Catholic Church has constantly cherished 
local customs and groups as irreplaceable developers of individual 
and collective identities as well as of freedoms. Along with other 
voices that tried to balance universalism and particularism 
especially after the Second World War,78 the Catholic Church has 
therefore urged balance between the opposing poles of universality 
 
 74. DE LUBAC, supra note 16, at 221. 
 75. COMPENDIUM, supra note 47, § 433. 
 76. Id. § 434. 
 77. POPE FRANCIS, supra note 10, para. 51. 
 78. As Eleanor Roosevelt argued when working on the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, “universal human rights begin . . . [i]n small places close to home—so close 
and so small that they cannot be seen on any map of the world,” and “[u]nless these rights 
have meaning there, they have little meaning everywhere.” Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as 
a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 38 (2003). 
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and particularity, rather than trying to put them into a 
hierarchical order.79 
Balancing universality and particularity has not been easy for 
the Church itself.80 It has become especially difficult recently 
because of the rise of cosmopolitanism and sovereignism, which 
have exacerbated tensions within Catholicism.81 As Ulrich Beck 
emphasized, cosmopolitanism developed as a distinct 
“methodological concept which helps to overcome methodological 
nationalism and to build a frame of reference to analyze the new 
social conflicts, dynamics and structures of Second Modernity.”82 
Cosmopolitanism, however, has promoted a cultural mindset that 
sees the world as a flat plane, on which individuals and ideas 
should be capable of moving freely.83 Within this intellectual 
framework, local traditions, laws, and customs are often perceived 
as obstacles to social mobility and cultural amalgamation. Pierre 
Manent has summarized the cosmopolitanism extreme as follows: 
“[T]he only humanly significant realities, the only ones which are 
entitled to incontestable rights, are the individual on the one hand 
and humanity on the other; between these two, strictly speaking, 
there is nothing of worth.”84 Cosmopolitanism has thus affected the 
delicate balance between universalism and particularism, 
prioritizing the former over the latter. 
 
 79. As noted by Carozza, the principle of subsidiarity offered “a conceptual tool to 
mediate the polarity of pluralism and the common good in a globalized world.” Id. It 
underscored and legitimized the “inherent tension in international human rights law 
between affirming a universal substantive vision of human dignity and respecting the 
diversity and freedom of human cultures.” Id. 
 80. As for Europe, see Olivier Roy, Populism and Christianity: The Tale of Two Continents, 
BERKLEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS.: GEO. U. (Dec. 18, 2019), 
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/populism-and-christianity-the-tale-of-
two-continents (“[T]he Catholic Church has a problem to find a way to reconcile its claim for 
universality with its sentimental attachment to the same ‘Christian identity’ of Europe.”). 
 81. Cosmopolitanism in itself is an ancient political idea, which originated in ancient 
Greece and survived the ages in philosophical literature. For a recent consideration on the 
historical relationships between cosmopolitanism and Christianity, see Nicholas Aroney, 
Christianity, Sovereignty, and Global Law, in CHRISTIANITY AND GLOBAL LAW (Rafael Domingo 
& John Witte, Jr. eds., 2020). 
 82. Ulrich Beck, The Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies, 19 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 
17, 18 (2002). 
 83. See Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1022, 1025 (2007). 
 84. Pierre Manent, Populist Demagogy and the Fanaticism of the Center,  
J. AM. AFFS. (2017), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/05/populist-demagogy-and-
the-fanaticism-of-the-center/. 
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The history and the present status of European integration 
provide good examples of how universalism morphed into 
cosmopolitanism. The project of integrating Western European 
countries into a bigger legal framework was born out of the will of 
Catholic political leaders such as Robert Schuman, Konrad 
Adenauer, and Alcide de Gasperi. They thought that supranational 
institutions would restore peace and prosperity on the Continent, 
as well as create a new European polity, deeply rooted in Christian 
teachings.85 It is no surprise, then, that Catholics overwhelmingly 
favored European integration in its early decades, especially in 
comparison with Protestants.86 
The pan-European project fleshed out the Catholic ideals of 
universalism and its commitment to the unity of the human family 
within the Old Continent, gaining the papal support of Saint John 
Paul II, who celebrated the alliance between Christianity and 
European integration more than once.87 
While praising the integration process, however, John Paul II 
qualified his judgment. Addressing the European Parliament in 
1998, he shared his vision of 
[a] common political structure, the product of the free will of 
European citizens . . . able to guarantee more equitably the rights, 
in particular the cultural rights, of all its regions. These united 
European peoples will not accept the domination of one nation or 
culture over the others, but they will uphold the equal right of all 
to enrich others with their difference.88 
In Ecclesia in Europa (The Church in Europe), the exhortation 
that he delivered in 2003 after a Synod of Bishops that focused on 
 
 85. See Rosario Forlenza, The Politics of the Abendland: Christian Democracy and the Idea 
of Europe after the Second World War, 26 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 261 (2017). 
 86. Brent F. Nelsen & James L. Guth, Losing Faith: Religion and Attitudes Toward the 
European Union in Uncertain Times, 58 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 909, 909 (2020) (“Surveys dating 
back to 1970 have demonstrated that, controlling for all other factors, Catholics favor 
integration, while Protestants express far less support for the EU.”). 
 87. See Pope John Paul II, Address During the Visit to the European Parliament paras. 
3–4 (Oct. 11, 1988) [hereinafter Pope John Paul II, Address to European Parliament], 
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1988/october/documents/ 
hf_jp-ii_spe_19881011_european-parliament.html; POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC 
EXHORTATION: ECCLESIA IN EUROPA para. 12 (2003) [hereinafter POPE JOHN PAUL II, ECCLESIA 
IN EUROPA], http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_exhortations/ 
documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_20030628_ecclesia-in-europa.html. 
 88. Pope John Paul II, Address to European Parliament, supra note 87. 
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both the current status and the future of Europe, he further distilled 
his prophesy: 
We joyfully recognize the growing openness of peoples to one 
another, the reconciliation between countries which have been 
hostile and at enmity with each other for a long time, the 
progressive opening up to the countries of Eastern Europe in the 
process of seeking deeper unity. Mutual recognition, forms of 
cooperation and exchanges of all sorts are being developed in such a 
way that little by little, a culture, indeed a European consciousness, 
is being created. This we hope will encourage, especially among 
the young, a sense of fraternity and the will to share. We note as a 
very positive factor that the whole of this process is developing 
according to democratic procedures, in a peaceful way and in the 
spirit of freedom which respects and fosters legitimate diversity, 
encouraging and sustaining the process leading to the growing 
unity of Europe. We welcome with satisfaction all that has been 
done to safeguard the conditions and ways to respect human 
rights. Finally, in the context of the legitimate economic and 
political unity in Europe, while acknowledging the signs of hope 
seen by the attention given to the rights and to the quality of life, we 
sincerely hope that, in creative fidelity to the humanist and 
Christian traditions of our continent, there will be a guarantee of 
the primacy of ethical and spiritual values.89 
Over the years, a so-called neo-functionalist approach seems to 
have frustrated these papal expectations and built the Union’s 
image as a technocratic, elitist, and cosmopolitan framework that 
remains distant from the people’s needs and even threatens their 
particular cultures. While state governments have remained in 
control of the European Communities’ and later of the European 
Union’s institutions, a European polity has never really surfaced.90 
The European Communities’ and the European Union’s main focus 
has remained the economy and its globalization, while topics of 
higher moral or political salience, on which Europeans divide 
themselves culturally or geographically, have been avoided or 
tackled from an economic angle.91 The same transformation of the 
European Union from an international law into a constitutional law 
 
 89. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ECCLESIA IN EUROPA, supra note 87 (emphasis in the original). 
 90. Daniel Innerarity, Does Europe Need a Demos to Be Truly Democratic? 1–2 (London 
Sch. Econ. “Europe in Question” Series (LEQS), Paper No. 77/2014, 2014). 
 91. Andrea Pin & John Witte, Jr., Meet the New Boss of Religious Freedom: The New Cases 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 55 TEX. INT’L L. REV. 223, 230 (2020). 
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framework took place in a sort of sleight of hand, which avoided 
dealing with the various polities that still make up Europe: after 
two domestic referenda aborted the project for a European Union’s 
Constitution, the same text that had been rejected later entered into 
force as a “Treaty.”92 It is quite understandable, then, that the 
European Union has garnered the reputation of being a 
technocratic, elitist, and cosmopolitan framework that remains 
distant from people’s cultures and needs. 
One episode epitomizes how dramatically the European Union 
alienated Catholic support before 2012, when the global crisis hit 
Europe the hardest, by espousing the cosmopolitanism ideal at the 
expense of particularism. While drafting the Constitutional text, the 
Union’s institutions refused the widespread invitations—including 
those from then-Pope John Paul II93 who had done so much for the 
freedom of the Union’s Eastern State members—to include any 
reference to Christianity within the preamble under the assumption 
that citing a religious tradition would have made the text partisan. 
To many, such refusal symbolized the end of the longstanding 
connection between the Catholic Church and the Union. The pan-
Continental institution that so many Catholics had worked for was 
turning against its origin and even fighting Christianity.94 Or, to use 
religious terms, “Europe could unite and gain the whole world, but 
[was losing] its soul.”95 
Because of those developments, many Catholics now suspect 
that the cosmopolitan drift of both liberalism and universalism 
deprives a country of its culture and ideals for the sake of the 
individual’s self-realization. Yet they increasingly also perceive 
migration as a demographic partner, especially in countries such as 
Italy, Hungary, or Poland, which have a long story of emigration 
 
 92. Adam Kreidman, Correcting Past Mistakes: The Failure of the European Constitution 
and Its Resurrection as the Lisbon Treaty, 5 MIAMI-FLORIDA EUR. CTR. EXCELLENCE (May 2008). 
 93. Jason Horowitz, Europe, Seeking Political Unity, Stumbles Over Issue of Religion, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 7, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/07/world/europe/europe-
seeking-political-unity-stumbles-over-issue-of-religion.html. 
 94. Matthew Cantirino, Is The European Union A Catholic Plot?, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 18, 
2012), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2012/01/is-the-european-union-a-
catholic-plot (“EU bureaucrats have become justly notorious for their hostility towards 
religion, and especially Christianity, in the public square.”). 
 95. Brent F. Nelsen, European Integration and the Catholic and Protestant Churches 13 
(Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Annual Meeting Paper, 2013) 
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rather than immigration.96 Populists accuse immigration of political 
and legal developments that resonate with Catholic concerns for 
localism: immigrants might dilute a country’s cultural specificities, 
disrupt its economic and societal makeup, and push institutions to 
change their laws to accommodate newcomers.97 Although 
Catholic sensitivity to the needs of migrants that seek a decent life 
or barely to survive through embarking on inhumane travels, 
populist forces have thus gained teeth within Catholic circles due 
to their resistance to immigration. 
By emphasizing the necessity of preserving a country’s heritage 
and identity against massive inflows of migrants, populists 
advocate for the need of what they call the forgotten people and pit 
their own agenda against the “transnational monster of liberalism 
and multiculturalism.”98 They develop anti-elitist and anti-
cosmopolitan narratives that aim to protect local traditions from 
supranational institutions as well as from newcomers. Within the 
hands of populists, localism morphs into an identitarian narrative 
that advocates the preservation of national collectivities from the 
arrival of newcomers through an overtly religious rhetoric. 
Aiming to restore the link between the individual and the polity 
through identitarian narratives, populist parties and governments 
have magnified the historical role of Christianity within their 
language and legal texts. Once again, the Hungarian constitutional 
trajectory exemplifies this trend: the Hungarian Constitutional 
Preamble makes explicit reference to Christianity, and the leading 
 
 96. See MERCATOR FORUM MIGRATION & DEMOCRACY (MIDEM), ANNUAL REPORT ON 
MIGRATION AND POPULISM 5 (2018) [hereinafter MIDEM], https://forum-
midem.de/cms/data/fm/download/TUD_MIDEM_Jahresbericht2018_Excerpt_FINAL.pd
f (“Culturally grounded arguments for the rejection of migration are particularly 
pronounced in countries with a low share of foreigners . . . [where] the fear of losing identity 
and social cohesion promotes opposition to migration.”). According to Michał Kowalski, 
Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries have not been directly affected by 
the Mediterranean refugee crisis. Michal Kowalski, From a Different Angle—Poland and the 
Mediterranean Refugee Crisis, 17 GERMAN L.J., 967, 968, 970 (2016). This, Kowalski writes, 
“might explain Poland’s most skeptical approach towards the European Commission’s 
proposals aimed at burden sharing among the Member States based on the relocation of 
refugees.” Id. at 968. 
 97. MIDEM, supra note 96, at 15 (“Parties like PiS in Poland or Fidesz in Hungary were 
successful in describing European ‘refugee quotas’ as a threat to national sovereignty . . . 
[and] claim[ing] the[ir] role of protectors.”). 
 98. This expression was used by Orban to define the European Union. See Joseph 
Ewing, Viktor Orban, in THE MIGHTY AND THE ALMIGHTY: HOW POLITICAL LEADERS DO GOD 
loc. 2318 (Nick Spencer ed., 2017) (ebook). 
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party, Fidesz, now poses as the defender of European culture.99 In 
Italy, Matteo Salvini, the leader of the Lega party, consistently uses 
religious symbols and claims in his political rallies.100 Disgruntled 
Italian Catholics easily identify with his narrative because it depicts 
the European Union as an engine of liberal, cosmopolitan, and 
secularist ideas, as well as a promoter of global migration,  
against which they think they should react in the name of their 
identity and for the sake of their survival.101 Populists’ logic thus 
conflates Christianity with tradition and religion with ethnicity,  
but it is certainly appealing to those who feel that localism has  
been neglected. 
Despite their claim to restore a Christian Europe, however, 
national populists do not always support the comeback of Christian 
rituals or practices. They rather endorse visions of “secularized 
Christianity-as-culture” or of a “civilizational and identitarian 
Christianism.”102 They make religious narratives and symbols into 
identitarian tools, promoting religion as a matter of belonging 
rather than believing.103 
Such an identitarian approach is problematic in two ways for 
Catholicism. First, the separation of belonging from believing 
clashes with Catholic social thinking. As Professor Oliver Roy has 
noted, “[a]lthough the [Catholic] Church does not reject the concept 
of the ‘Christian identity’ of Europe, it has stressed, since Pope John 
Paul II, that this identity should go along with faith and Christian 
values and norms.”104 Second, the insistence on the political role of 
tradition that is so widespread among European populists is not 
quintessentially Catholic. European populists leverage their 
 
 99. Religious tradition is explicitly rooted in the Preamble of the Hungarian 
Constitution (2011), which proudly celebrates King Saint Stephen as the builder of the 
Hungarian State as “a part of Christian Europe one thousand years ago.” See Andras Bozóki 
& Zoltan Ádám, State and Faith: Right-wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in Hungary, 2 E. 
EUR. J. SOC’Y & POL. 98, 100–22 (2016). 
 100. Roy, supra note 80 (describing Salvini’s “constant exhibition of Catholic symbols 
(crucifix, rosary, invocation of Virgin Mary)”). 
 101. Willfred Spohn, Europeanization, Religion and Collective Identities in an Enlarging 
Europe, 12 EUR. J. SOC. THEORY 358, 358–60 (2009). 
 102. Rogers Brubaker, Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist 
Moment in Comparative Perspective, 40 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1191, 1199 (2017) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 103. See generally Olivier Roy, Beyond Populism: The Conservative Right, the Courts, the 
Churches and the Concept of a Christian Europe, in SAVING THE PEOPLE: HOW POPULISTS HIJACK 
RELIGION 185, 185–201 (Nadia Marzouki, Duncan McDonnell & Olivier Roy eds., 2016). 
 104. Roy, supra note 80. 
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countries’ Catholic ancestry, rather than the Catholic traditional 
philosophical style of reasoning. While it is true that prominent 
Catholic philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre value the 
importance of tradition for moral inquiry,105 Catholic social 
thinking has constantly maintained that the liberties and legal 
values it cherishes are rooted in the nature of human beings,106 not 
simply in Christian revelation or tradition.107 
The mismatch between the support gained by populists 
through their identitarian and traditionalist narrative and the 
Catholic distinctive interest in natural law probably further reflects 
deep rifts within contemporary Catholic culture. As a matter of fact, 
although the Catholic world abounds with legal philosophers 
arguing on the basis of natural law theories, the mobilization of 
Catholics against liberalism, cosmopolitanism, the European 
Union, or the lingua franca of rights has found its preferential 
language in tradition instead of natural law. To some extent,  
the success of populist narratives and their tradition-based 
language show that natural law language, albeit well-rooted  
within Catholic philosophy, does not hold much sway among  
the Catholic multitudes. 
III. LEGAL INTERPRETATION AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS:  
THE ATTACKS ON THE JUDICIARY 
Many of the worrisome reforms that populist governments 
have introduced lately focus on the judiciary. Recently, Polish and 
Hungarian laws have targeted judicial independence, rulings, and 
powers to review legislation, thereby triggering deep 
controversy.108 It is safe to say that, within populist ranks, the ideal 
of democratic legitimization has obscured the importance of the 
rule of law more than once.109 Once in charge, populist parties may 
 
 105. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 7 (1988). 
 106. NIEBUHR, supra note 22, at 135. 
 107. DOE, supra note 17, at 382 (emphasizing that Catholic canon law still gives a special 
place to natural law). 
 108. See, e.g., Wojciech Sadurski & Maximilian Steinbeis, What Is Going on in Poland Is 
an Attack Against Democracy, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (July 15, 2016), 
https://verfassungsblog.de/what-is-going-on-in-poland-is-an-attack-against-democracy/; 
Gábor Halmai, Dismantling Constitutional Review in Hungary, 1/2019 RIVISTA DI DIRITTI 
COMPARATI 31, 31–47 (2019). 
 109. See Renata Uitz, The Return of the Sovereign: A Look at the Rule of Law in Hungary—
and in Europe, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Apr. 5, 2017), https://verfassungsblog.de/the-return-of-
the-sovereign-a-look-at-the-rule-of-law-in-hungary-and-in-europe/. 
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shake the foundations of a constitutional system by implementing 
reforms that threaten the separation of powers. 
Like with democracy and fundamental rights, the Catholic 
viewpoint on the separation of powers doctrine has dramatically 
shifted over time. As is well-known, this theory was originally 
rejected by the Catholic Church because it was seen as a threat to 
the indivisible and divine nature of authority.110 Throughout the 
twentieth century, however, Catholicism has slowly softened its 
position, eventually coming to embrace the separation of powers as 
an important pillar for the organization of society. In particular, 
Pope John Paul II celebrated the separation of powers while 
demonizing the “absolute power” of Marxist-Leninist 
totalitarianism.111 His Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus stated 
that “a sound theory of the State” should embrace the “rule of law” 
and envision a legal order within which “each power [is] balanced 
by other powers and by other spheres of responsibility which keep 
it within proper bounds.”112 Once again, while the fight against 
communism supported the alliance between Catholicism and 
liberalism, praise for the separation of powers enshrined in the 
Encyclical seemed to confirm that a wedding had taken place 
between Catholicism and liberal constitutionalism. Similar to what 
happened to human rights and liberalism, many hopes were 
misplaced also in respect to the separation of powers. In fact, the 
clash between liberalism and Catholic legal and political culture 
has also involved the judicial sphere. 
In the late twentieth century, various strands of liberalism 
entrusted and empowered the judiciary with the role of solving 
“some of the most pertinent and polemical political controversies a 
 
 110. See, e.g., POPE LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: IMMORTALE DEI para. 18 (1885), 
http://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_ 
01111885_immortale-dei.html (“[T]he ruling powers are invested with a sacredness more 
than human, and are withheld from deviating from the path of duty, and from overstepping 
the bounds of rightful authority . . . .”). 
 111.  POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 15, para. 44. 
 112. Id. (“[O]ne passage of Rerum Novarum . . . presents the organization of society 
according to the three powers—legislative, executive and judicial—, something which at the 
time represented a novelty in Church teaching. Such an ordering reflects a realistic vision of 
man’s social nature, which calls for legislation capable of protecting the freedom of all. To 
that end, it is preferable that each power be balanced by other powers and by other spheres 
of responsibility which keep it within proper bounds. This is the principle of the ‘rule of law’, 
in which the law is sovereign, and not the arbitrary will of individuals.”) (footnote omitted). 
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democratic polity can contemplate.”113 Judges thus left their role of 
“mouth of the law” to take up that of making justice case-by-case.114 
Additionally, in civil law jurisdictions they took on the role of 
making the law evolve on their shoulders.115 In Europe, courts 
became the defenders of democracy and human rights because of 
their capacity to connect the domestic legal order with the pan-
European one in practical ways, even circumventing the political 
process.116 In the 1990s to early 2000s, the idea of “judicial dialogue” 
stimulated and reinforced judicial activism by fostering the practice 
of borrowing and lending legal ideas across domestic and 
supranational jurisdictions.117 
Some have found that such an empowerment of the judiciary 
takes place at the expense of legislative powers and the political 
process,118 and transforms the angle from which formidable societal 
issues are tackled. Judicial narratives are capable of flattening 
“questions of meaning, identity, and purpose into questions of 
 
 113. Ran Hirschl, The New Constitution and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 722 (2006). 
 114. For a discussion on the relationship between judicial activism and the separation 
of powers doctrine, see Luca Pietro Vanoni, New Challenges to the Separation of Powers: The 
Role of Constitutional Courts, in NEW CHALLENGES TO THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: DIVIDING 
POWER 46, 46–77 (Antonia Baraggia, Cristina Fasone & Luca Pietro Vanoni eds., 2020). 
 115. In the words of the former Italian Constitutional Court President Paolo Grossi, 
[y]esterday, in the modern era, a judge’s job was to adapt the fact to the legal rule 
(legal rules were designed as major premises of a logic-deductive syllogism). 
Today, in the post-modern legal era, the judge has to understand the facts behind 
the case-law through a uniquely evaluative process and adapt the legal rule to this 
fact of life, looking for the more adjust solution. The judge’s job is therefore 
materializing into a process of invention [which in Latin designs the act of 
“finding”] that is opposite to a syllogism because it involves not only the logic and 
rational abilities of the judges, but especially his axiologic abilities such as 
intuition, perception, comprehension. 
Paolo Grossi, La invenzione del diritto: a proposito della funzione dei giudici (Luca P. Vanoni 
trans., 2017), https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/interventi_presidente/ 
Grossi_Scandicci.pdf. 
 116. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN 
EUROPE 193 (2002) (“In today’s multi-tiered European polity, the sovereignty of the 
legislature, and the primacy of national executives, are dead. In concert or in rivalry, 
European legislators govern with judges.”). 
 117. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 99, 99–137 (1994). 
 118. Manent, supra note 84 (“The democratic system which rested on a certain 
equilibrium between executive power and legislative power tends to be substituted by a 
system which is dominated by a scattered and diffused judicial power which derives its 
legitimacy from itself.”). 
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equality and fairness.”119 They deal with cultural, ideological, and 
political issues from the point of view of statutes and judicial 
precedent.120 These phenomena clash with the Catholic sensitivity 
for moral questions and its insistence that political bodies should 
have a say in them.121 
Such an individualistic, rights-based narrative that has 
prevailed within the judicial realm has served the Polish and 
Hungarian attacks on domestic courts’ powers and independence. 
The empowerment of the judiciary provided populist parties with 
the perfect enemy to fight.122 As populists fight cosmopolitanism 
and individualism, they can easily target judges as domestic 
hotspots of such ideals. The attack on the judiciary in Poland, which 
some have seen as part of “a comprehensive and largely successful 
assault on its fundamental constitutional institutions by the 
victorious party,” Prawo i Sprawiedliwość,123 exemplifies this 
phenomenon. Until recently, the Polish judiciary had the 
reputation of being one of the most activist judicial branches of 
Western democracies. Some even found that such activism had led 
to an “imbalance between powers.”124 Such charges have lately 
provided a cheap justification for the national reforms that have 
undercut judicial independence. 
In Poland, such reforms have forced Catholic public figures and 
institutions to take sides, shaking the unity of the Church. At the 
beginning of the populist regime in 2015 and 2016, many bishops’ 
silence was interpreted as a sign of tacit support. The controversial, 
Catholic conservative and very popular Radio Maryja, however, 
started broadcasting nationalistic programs criticizing the 
 
 119. Michael Sandel, Populism, Trump, and the Future of Democracy, OPENDEMOCRACY 
(May 9, 2018), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/populism-trump-and-future-of-
democracy/. 
 120. See Pin, supra note 40, at 242. 
 121. DENEEN, supra note 8, at 31 (stating that liberalism fosters anthropological individualism). 
 122. See Luca Pietro Vanoni & Benedetta Vimercati, Dall’identità alle identity politics: la 
rinascita dei nazionalismi nel sistema costituzionale europeo, 1 QUADERNI CONSTITUZIONALI 39 
(2020) (arguing that the increasingly political role of litigation triggered populist reactions in 
Poland in Hungary as well as elsewhere in Europe). 
 123. Wojciech Sadurski, Constitutional Design: Lessons from Poland’s Democratic 
Backsliding, 6 CONST. STUD. 59, 60 (2020). 
 124. See IUSTITIA POLUSKA, RESPONSE TO THE WHITE PAPER COMPENDIUM ON THE 
REFORMS OF THE POLISH JUSTICE SYSTEM, PRESENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
POLAND TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Mar. 2018), https://www.statewatch.org/news/ 
2018/mar/pl-judges-association-response-judiciary-reform-3-18.pdf. 
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European liberal order.125 When the President Andrzej Duda 
vetoed bills aiming to reform the judiciary system in 2017, 
Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki “congratulated the turn of the 
President . . . with a letter in which he outlined the principle of 
separation of powers in conformity with the Catholic Social 
Doctrine.”126 Once again, post-modern rifts penetrated Catholic 
culture and trapped it in a political and ideological battle. 
CONCLUSION 
Post-modern ideals have reshaped the intellectual frameworks 
of constitutional and international law. Globalization, 
supranationalism, and cosmopolitanism, which have marked the 
passage from “solid” to “liquid” times,127 have become powerful 
hermeneutical tools, affecting legal and political thinking. 
However, they have also sparked much controversy, triggering 
deep polarization within contemporary societies. Catholicism has 
been no exception. Challenged by new legal narratives and global 
phenomena, such as the 2008 economic crisis or massive migration, 
Catholics have not responded with one voice. Struggles between 
those who have heeded cosmopolitanism’s call on one side, and the 
supporters of populism and sovereignism on the other side, have 
mobilized the equilibrium sought by Catholicism between 
universalism and particularism, threatening the historical alliance 
between Catholicism and liberalism and questioning Catholic 
support for human rights. In short, the polarization of the post-
 
 125. Radio Maryja is a radio station founded in Toruń, Poland, on December 9, 1991, by 
Father Tadeusz Rydzyk. It endorses a social-conservative vision of the Catholic faith and 
presents itself as “‘the Catholic voice at your home.’” Alfred M. Wierzbicki, Present Condition 
and Role of the Catholic Church in Poland, 38 OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN E. EUR. 99 
(2018), https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol38/iss5/6. According to José Pedro 
Zúquete, Radio Maryja constitutes a clear example of the “politicization of religious 
discourse” that morphs into “religious populism” because this radio station “promotes, and 
is the epitome of, a certain version of Polish Catholicism as an ‘ideology of struggle.’” José 
Pedro Zúquete, Populism and Religion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM 447 (Cristóbal 
Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo & Pierre Ostiguy eds. 2017). 
 126. Wierzbicki, supra note 125, at 98. Catholic doctrine has highlighted the importance 
of independence of the judiciary. See, e.g., POPE JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: PACEM IN 
TERRIS para. 69 (1963), http://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/ 
documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html (“[J]ustice must be administered 
impartially, and judges must be wholly incorrupt and uninfluenced by the solicitations of 
interested parties.”). 
 127. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, LIQUID TIMES: LIVING IN THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 3 (2007). 
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modern age has spilled into the Catholic world, disrupting its unity 
and creating new gaps between Catholics. 
The rifts within the Catholic Church thus largely reflect the 
variety of post-modern understandings of liberalism. When 
liberalism championed the values of the rule of law, human rights, 
and democracy, Catholicism happily embraced it. When it  
sought to monopolize the public philosophy and force other 
political cultures outside the list of marketable ideas, Catholic 
voices disagreed. Hollowing out spirituality, drying out local 
cultures, and putting cultures in a straitjacket was not an option  
for Catholicism. 
Recent developments in liberalism have fueled the populist 
backlash. Through their rhetoric, populist parties magnify the 
traditional roots and religious identity of Western democracies, 
aiming to muster Catholic support. A closer look reveals, however, 
that the populist agenda does not fit comfortably within some of 
the basic tenets of Catholic culture. It downplays the duty of 
solidarity that is deeply rooted in Catholic teachings, while its 
ethnocentrism and nationalism overlook Catholic universalism.128 
Populism may have surfaced to counter the diseases of 
post-modern liberalism, but it has subsequently become part of 
the sickness. 
Since the end of World War II, the alliance between Catholicism 
and liberalism has nurtured a sense of respect for the dignity of 
human beings and fostered the development of a robust 
constitutional culture. Catholicism as a whole has not abandoned 
liberalism because it does not endorse such ideals anymore; on the 
contrary, it has rather distanced itself from liberalism because it 
does not perceive it as compatible with key ideals such as localism 
or transcendence, or solidarity with the poor. Those who are 
sympathetic with populist stances therefore often value aspects of 
Catholicism that may fail to shine within contemporary liberalism. 
Some years ago, writing about multiculturalism, the Catholic 
theologian Javier Prades identified some aspects of modernity that, 
in his view, would prove to be significant challenges. He noted the 
contemporary emphasis on technocracy and the replacement of 
 
 128. See JOHN PAUL II, MEMORIA E IDENTITÀ, supra note 56, at 86 (“Caratteristica del 
nazionalismo . . . è di riconoscere e perseguire soltanto il bene della propria nazione, senza 
tener conto dei diritti delle altre. Il patriottismo, invece, in quanto amore per la patria, 
riconosce a tutte le altre nazioni diritti uguali a quelli rivendicati per la propria ed è perciò 
la via per un ordinato amore sociale.”). 
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narratives focused on goals with those focused on means,129 the 
extent to which universality is often opposed to particularity,130 and 
the difficulties in reconciling tradition with modernity.131 This 
Article has illustrated that similar difficulties are now 
characterizing the debate between populism and liberalism. After 
his diagnosis, Prades suggested that cultural differences need not 
be cured, but better understood as mutually provocative, urging 
society at large to consider them seriously and attentively.132 
Prades’s suggestion holds true within the struggle between 
liberalism and populism: a lively culture can heed both the calls 
surfacing within liberalism and populism, without blessing either 
with the chrism of sacredness while rejecting the other. These 
disagreements need not drive Catholics apart: rather than fight, 
Catholic proponents of liberalism and populism can embrace a 
mutually enlightening open dialogue and talk.133 
 
 
 129. JAVIER PRADES, OCCIDENTE: L’INELUDIBILE INCONTRO 19 (2008). 
 130. Id. at 28. 
 131. Id. at 32–33, 123. 
 132. Id. at 7. 
 133. See John Witte, Jr., To Serve Right and to Fight Wrong, in POPE BENEDICT XVI’S LEGAL 
THOUGHT 119 (Marta Cartabia & Andrea Simoncini eds., 2015) (suggesting that what modern 
societies mostly need is a “collective discourse of competing understandings . . . of the divine 
and the human, of good and evil, of individuality and community”). 
